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EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN
RETIREMENT FUNDS
Michael Evan Gold*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An employer who maintains a retirement fund for the benefit of his
employees must face, in one way or another, the problem of paying the
cost of retirement benefits. Such benefits are typically paid in equal
monthly installments until the retiree dies.1 In the past, many employers were content to make these payments from current revenues. Other
employers, more concerned about the welfare of their employees after
the business closed, created trust funds to meet retirement costs;
they retained actuaries, who predicted future costs and determined the
amount which had to be raised and invested in order to meet those costs.
Since the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19742 has
taken effect, all retirement plans must secure actuarial advice and
establish funding programs to meet the cost of future retirement benefits.' Money for this purpose is generally raised by regular contributions to the retirement fund from two sources: the employer, who takes
money from revenues to make "employer contributions," and the employee, who, by having money withheld from his pay check, makes
"employee contributions."
Historically, retirement funds have distinguished between male and
female employee-beneficiaries. This distinction is generally made either
by requiring that females make higher contributions than their male
counterparts, 4 in order to receive equal periodic benefits upon retirement, or by requiring that females make equal contributions,
* B.A., 1965 (University of California, Berkeley); LL.B., 1967 (Stanford University); Associate Professor of Law, University of San Fernando Valley College of Law.
1. There are other options, of course. For example, a retiree may elect a joint
annuity with his spouse, so that benefits (reduced to reflect two life interests) continue
as long as either of the spouses is alive. Also the retirement allowance may be
distributed as a single lump sum benefit when the employee retires. All such options are
actuarial equivalents; that is, they result in the same cost to the retirement fund.
Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is immaterial which option a retiree chooses.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as ERISA].
3. See id. §§ 1023, 1082-85.
4. "Counterparts" are a male and a female who enter the service of an employer on
the same date and at the same age and have identical employment histories.
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causing them to receive lower periodic benefits.

The rationale for

this practice is based upon separate, sex-based mortality tables which
show that women outlive men, and thus women will draw bene-

fits fqr a longer period of time.5

If equal contributions were

accepted from counterparts, and equal periodic benefits were paid
to them, the female would receive more for her money or, expressed differently, the male would be subsidizing the cost of the female's benefits. Because of female longevity, retirement funds have

been effectively split into two separate funds, one for men and another for women, with each fund being self-sustaining. If the female
fund is to pay the same periodic benefits as the male fund, more must

be collected in contributions from women because more will be paid
out; or, if contributions to the two funds are equal, the female fund must

pay out lower periodic benefits.6 This practice reflects the belief (reminiscent of the separate-but-equal philosophy) that equal opportunities
are offered only if no money contributed by or on behalf of persons
of one sex is used to help pay for benefits received by persons of the
7
other sex.

Recently, this separate funding practice has come under attack. In
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power' a

federal district court held that an employer and its retirement fund
which paid equal periodic benefits to counterparts after retirement, but

which required females to make higher contributions to the fund than
5. These tables reveal that a woman retiree who dies when the sum of the ages at
death divided by the number of deaths for her sex (that is, the "average woman") is
likely to be age 84, while the "average man" will be age 79. See Henderson v. Oregon,
405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore. 1975).
6. To illustrate, if equal periodic benefits are $2.00 per year, funded half by employer
contributions and half by employee contributions, the average woman will draw $38.00
in benefits over her 19-year life-span, while the average man will draw only $28.00 over
his 14 years. The woman would be required to contribute $19.00 to the female fund
during her working years, and the man would be required to contribute $14.00 to the
male fund. Or, if contributions are kept equal, and the counterparts each contribute
$14.00, the woman would receive $1.47 per year in benefits, and the man would receive
$2.00 per year. This illustration ignores any growth in the retirement fund due to
interest and appreciation of capital.
7. Because the retirement funds are not literally split in two, it may be more accurate
to conceptualize the rationale for their practice as a belief that equal opportunities are
offered if the average woman receives a sum of benefits which bears the same ratio to
her contributions as the ratio of benefits to contributions of the average man. Using the
figures in note 6 supra, the ratio of benefits to contributions where periodic benefits are
equal is: (male) $28:$14 = 2:1 and (female) $38:$19 = 2:1; where contributions
are equal, the ratio is (male and female) $28:$14 = 2:1.
8. 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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males during their working years, were guilty of an unlawful employment practice under section 703(a)(1) 9 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,10 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 (Title VII or the Act)."- The court reached this conclusion on a
motion for preliminary injunction brought by the plaintiffs, a class of
female employees of the defendant employer; it issued the injunction 2
and subsequently granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Similarly, in Henderson v. Oregon,13 another federal district
court declared that it was an unlawful employment practice for an employer's -retirement fund to pay a lower monthly retirement benefit
to a woman than to her male counterpart.' 4 These cases, on appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and others like them
are progressing through the courts.' 5 It is appropriate, therefore, to
consider whether Title VII, calling for equal employment opportunities,
requires that male and female counterparts make equal contributions
to their retirement fund and receive equal periodic benefits from it.
The first step in the analysis will be to determine whether Title VII
applies to retirement funds. The second step will be to study the
reasoning of the courts which have held that the Act prohibits
retirement funds from exacting higher contributions from, or paying lower periodic benefits to, a female as compared to her
male counterpart. The theory of these cases is that the characteristics of
a class may not be applied to individual members of the class. But this
theory is unsatisfactory because it is neither supported by authorities,
nor does it decide the real issues involved in the retirement fund
problem. An alternative theory will be suggested, grounded on the
notion of equality of employment opportunities. This theory is generally applicable to cases of sex discrimination, but its application to the
9. Section 703 (a) (1) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
10. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253.
11. Act of March 24,1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
12. 387 F. Supp. at 984.
13. 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D.Ore. 1975).
14. Id. at 1275.
15. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, # 74-253-DWW (C.D. Cal. 1974); Spirit v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Corp., # 14-1654-RJW (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Reilly v. Robertson,
# 4098 (Ind. 1974).
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retirement fund context poses two questions: What is the proper defi-

nition of the employment opportunity?

What is the proper class to

bear the cost of that opportunity?
The third step in the analysis will be to evaluate various legal

arguments which may be raised as defenses to present employment
practices. The final step in the analysis will be to examine the remedies that courts have fashioned and to determine whether they have

made whole the victims of unlawful retirement fund practices.
I1.

DOES TITLE VII APPLY TO RETIREMENT FUNDS?

The -threshold question in the retirement fund problem is whether
Title VII applies to retirement funds. Five federal circuit courts of ap-

peals' G and several district courtsl 7 have held that the Act applies to
retirement funds. The earliest and most comprehensive consideration
of the question appears in Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc.18 There

the plaintiff complained that the retirement plan maintained by her
employer and her union allowed men to work until age 65, but

required women to retire at age 62. The defendants contended, inter
alia,19 that the Act does not apply to retirement funds.

The court gave

considerable attention to this argument, particularly because the defendants were able to cite a letter from Senator Humphrey,2 0 who was a
16. Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich, 12 F.E.P. 1533 (4th Cir. 1976); Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Rosen
v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys
U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
17. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974), remanded on other
grounds, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 5120 (June
28, 1976); Fillinger v. Fast Ohio Gas Co., 4 FEP 73 (N.D. Ohio, 1971).
18. 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
19. The defendants made two other contentions in their answer. First, they argued
that the filing of the complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
was premature since it was filed before the plaintiff was actually forced to retire. The
court disposed of this timeliness argument by holding that the plaintiff had properly
complained of the defendants' maintaining a discriminatory retirement plan, which was a
continuing violation of the Act, rather than complaining of her discharge only. Second,
the defendants contended that the applicable EEOC guidelines on retirement funds,
which prohibit different retirement ages for men and women, were arbitrary and
capricious. The court gave short shrift to the contention, finding it to be without merit.
The guidelines were then found in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.31(a) (1971), as amended 29
C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1975).
20. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1,189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971).
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leading figure in the management of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21
This letter, which was written sometime after the bill was enacted,
stated that the Act was not meant to impair existing pension and benefit
structures.22 The court responded to Senator Humphrey's letter and
indicated that the Act does apply to retirement funds. An examination of the Bartmess opinion will serve as a framework for a review
of the rationale on which the courts in general have relied in applying
the Act to retirement funds.
Hubert Humphrey played a key role in the Senate formulation of
the bill which eventually became Title VII.' In a letter Senator Humphrey stated that the Act was, in part, designed to improve the employment status of women and that "'it would be a gross distortion of the
provisions of Title VII to apply this language in a manner which
impaired existing pension, retirement, or benefit programs.' "24
Confronted with this expression of "legislative intent," the Bartmess
court offered three responses. First, it noted that the letter was of little
help in determining the legislative history of the Act because it was
written some time after the bill was enacted. 5 It appears, however, that
the court was unaware that Senator Humphrey had expressed the same
belief before the bill became law. In a colloquy on the floor of the Senate, Senator Randolph mentioned to Senator Humphrey that the Social
Security system treats men and women differently in some respects and
asked whether similar differences in industrial benefit plans could continue under the bill. Senator Humphrey answered affirmatively. 20 Although this exchange took place after the Senate had voted favorably on
the Bennett Amendment,2 7 which excluded from the reach of Title VII
any practice authorized under the Equal Pay Act of 1963,28 it did
precede final action in the Senate approving the entire bill. It seems
improper, therefore, to dismiss Senator Humphrey's views as untimely.
Second, the court believed that the debates in Congress neither supported nor refuted any legislative intent. In reaching this conclusion,
21. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253.
22. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
23. 110 CONG. Ruc. 13663 (1964) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
24. This excerpt from Senator Humphrey's letter is taken from Rosen v. Public Service
Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 463 (D.N.J. 1970), aff'd, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1973). The letter itself was presented to the Rosen court.
25. 444 F.2d at 1190.
26. 110 CoNG. RFc. 13663-64 (1964) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
27. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970)).
28. Act of June 10, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88,38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
206(d) (1970)).
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the court relied on an opinion of the district court in Rosen v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co.,2 9 where the legislative history of the Act was
examined and it was determined that the ban on sex discrimination was
added by the House of Representatives, without benefit of committee
hearings, by a Southern Congressman who evidently hoped thereby to
sabotage the bill.30 The Rosen court could point to no mention of the
reasons which moved Congress to include "sex" in the Act. Thus, the
Bartmess court was correct when it stated that the debates neither
support nor refute Senator Humphrey's belief, just as a denial of certiorarineither approves nor disapproves the decision of a lower court.8 1 But
such legislative history as does exist-namely, the Randolph-Humphrey
exchange-is, in Senator Humphrey's characteristic argot, "unmistakably clear, '" 2 and like the decision which does not warrant certiorari,it
stands as authority in the field. Great cases have turned on a single line
of legislative history, 3 and if Senator Humphrey's remark correctly
expressed the intent of Congress, the issue need not have been raised
again. Yet it must be noted that, by the time the sex provision was
added to the bill, Congress had little time for further discussion. 4
The Bartmess court's third response to Senator Humphrey's letter
was that, "absent some strong indication of legislative intent to the contrary, we must read the words of the statute with their commonly accepted meanings."3 5 Apparently, the court did not consider Senator
Humphrey's letter a strong indication of legislative intent, and how it
would have regarded the Senator's comments in the CongressionalRecord9 is a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, the principle is sound that
a court should adhere to the accepted meanings of words in a statute;
for, tax laws notwithstanding, legislators speak the same language as the
rest of us. Retirement funds contain "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" as those words are ordinarily used. Given the strong public policy of protecting retirement benefits, it may fairly be argued that
if Congress had intended to exclude retirement plans from the scope of
29. 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.NJ. 1970), affd, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. '1973).
30. Id. at 462-63 n.4.
31. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190; Agoston v. Commonwealth of Pa., 340 U.S. 844 (1950).
32. 110 CONG. Rc. 13664 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Bell is discussed in
Comment, Will the Real Managerial Employees Please Stand Up?, 9 LoY. L.A.L. REV.
92 (1975).
34. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. 444 F.2d at 1190.
36. See notes 26 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
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Title VII, it would have done so in explicit terms.17 While there are exemptions from the coverage of the Acte s none appears applicable to re-

tirement plans. 9 If such an exemption had been intended, yet inadvertently omitted, the opportunity to clarify the meaning of the Act came

in 1972 when Congress revised Title VII.40 At that time, it did not add
an exemption for retirement funds. Since Bartmess and several district
court cases already had been decided, 41 Congress had reason to know
that the courts were applying Title VII to retirement plans. The only
reasonable conclusion is that Congress did not share Senator Hum42
phrey's belief about the scope of the Act.
Having grappled with Senator Humphrey's letter, the Bartmess court
established, at most, that Congress did not intend to exclude retirement

funds from the reach of Title VII, but it remained for the court to suggest affirmative reasons for applying the Act to retirement funds. It of37. Indeed, it did just that in the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623
(1970). In that act, Congress used language identical to that of Title VII in defining
the coverage of the bill (compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1), (2) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. II 1972), but added an
express exemption for retirement plans. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1970). Without this
exemption, Congress surely foresaw that the language of sections 623 (a) (1) and (2),
which was plainly incorporated into the Age Discrimination Act from sections 703(a)
(1) and (2) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2) (Supp. II 1972)), would have been given its ordinary meaning and would have included retirement plans.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. II 1972) (religious exemption); id. § 2000e2(1) (1970) (BFOQ); id. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (religious and educational institutions); id. §
2000e-2(h) (seniority or merit systems; professional development ability tests; difference
in compensation sanctioned by Equal Pay Act of 1963). For a discussion of the
religious exemption from Title VII see Comment, Title VIi's Exemption for Religious
Institutions: Constitutionally Required or Constitutionally Forbidden?, 9 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 124 (1975).
39. It cannot be denied, however, that Congress might have overlooked the retirement
problem when debating Title VII, while that problem could hardly have been avoided
when debating the Age Discrimination Act. Yet, if Congress did overlook the effect of
Title VII on retirement funds, so much the more reason to revert to the ordinary
meaning of the language in the Act.
40. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e, et seq. (1970).
41. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
42. This conclusion is strengthened by the following sentence from the report of the
Conference Committee of the House and Senate on the 1972 revisions:
In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any areas where a
specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that the present case law
as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII.
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, SUBCOMM. ON ]LABOR, LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 1174 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY].
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fered four such reasons. The first is that section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act 3 provides that a bargaining representative is the
exclusive agent for collective bargaining in respect to "rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment,"
and this section has been held to include retirement benefits."
Section 703(a)(1) of the Act outlaws discrimination in "compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Apparently, because of the similarity of language in the two labor acts, the
court concluded that retirement funds are conditions of employment
under Title VII.15
This conclusion seems correct. It is probable that Congress had
section 9(a) in mind as it drafted section 703(a)(1), for when it
created a structure for handling charges of unlawful employment practices under Title VII, it chose as a model the structure it had previously
created for handling charges of unfair labor practices under the National
Labor Relations Act.4 6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 7 is plainly patterned after -the National Labor Relations
Board,4 8 and it is a reasonable inference that other sections of the National Labor Relations Act were also before Congress.49 In addition,
the language of section 703(a)(1) carries, in ordinary usage, a broader
meaning than the language of section 9(a), 50 and it would be anomalous if Congress intended the broader phrase to exclude retirement
funds while it intended the narrower phrase to include them.
Considerations of policy also support the Bartmess court's conclusion
that retirement benefits fall within the scope of section 703(a)(1).
From the viewpoint of an individual worker, who has struggled for
many years to reach retirement, he believes he has earned his pension.
Indeed, under most public and many private plans, he has earned at
least a portion of his pension because he has made contributions to the
43. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
44. Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
45. 444 F.2d at 1189.
46. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1970) with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1970).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970). This is parallel to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
49. The Supreme Court made such an inference when it found that the backpay
provision of Title VII was "expressly modeled on the backpay provision of the National
Labor Relations Act." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
50. A comparison of the two sections illustrates this. Thus, while section 703 (a) (1)
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970)) uses the terms "compensation," "conditions," and
"terms. . . or privileges of employment," section 9(a) uses the terms "rates of pay" and
"wages," "other conditions," and "hours of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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fund from his wages in addition to the contributions his employer has
made on his behalf. Even under plans where the employer is the
sole contributor, 5' the employee still pays for his pension in the form of
reduced wages; for it costs an employer nearly the same 2 whether he
commits himself to an increase in retirement benefits requiring him to
contribute five cents per hour to the retirement fund, or to an increase in
pay requiring him to put five cents per hour more into a paycheck.
Thus, if an employee wants a pension, he will see his wages accordingly
reduced (or increased less). Moreover, in most cases, the individual
employee has little choice as to whether his employer offers retirement
benefits or, if benefits are offered, whether to participate in the plan.
Indeed, in most instances, the employer or his trustee administers the
plan, requiring all employees to participate. The level of contributions
is established, and the employer withholds contributions from employees' wages. Thus, the employee pays for his pensions in the form of
direct contributions by reduced wages, making retirement benefits a
form of compensation within the meaning of section 703(a)(1) of the
Act; and he has no choice over whether to join the plan, making it a
condition of employment within the meaning of the same section of the
Act.
From the viewpoint of the public at large, policy also mandates that
retirement funds be included within Title VII's coverage. A person who retires at age 65 is likely to live another fifteen years."
During his working years, he has been promised a pension when he
retires, and he has relied on this promise by consuming money he might
otherwise have saved towards future needs. It makes more sense to
ensure that the promise of a pension is kept, and that money purportedly
set aside for retirement benefits is truly available for that purpose, than
to force the retired worker to demand higher Social Security payments,
4
burden his family, and eventually apply for welfare.
51. For example, the majority organized labor uses this type of plan.
52. The cost is not exactly the same because many persons withdraw from retirement
funds before their pensions vest. This "breakage" in defined benefit plans swells the
assets of the fund and allows for increased benefits at no increased cost to the employer
for those whose pensions do vest. In defined contribution plans, breakage is applied in
satisfaction of the employer's obligation to contribute.
53. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMAAC 734 (1975).
54. All of these alternatives involve taking money from persons presently working in
order to support retirees. Sound retirement funding takes money from working persons
to fund their own retirement and takes nothing for retirees from persons still working.
Through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(Supp. IV 1974), the nation has made a substantial commitment to protecting retirement
benefits.
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The second reason offered in Bartmess for including retirement funds
within the reach of the Act was that the EEOC has expressly applied the
Act to them.5 5 A decision of the agency charged with enforcing an act
is entitled to great deference in the courts, 56 and thus reliance by the
Bartmess court on the EEOC guideline seems well placed. 57
The third reason offered in Bartmess for including retirement funds
within the scope of Title VII was the language of section 703 itself,
which provides, in part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 58

While this section may be an enigma to some scholars,

9

its meaning was

clear to the Bartmess court; so clear, indeed, that the court merely

quoted the relevant language of the statute with the brief preface, "the
ERISA is the most recent step in protecting retirement benefits, but earlier steps
manifest concern in the area. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Act of
Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 2, 72 Stat. 997, which was repealed by ERISA,
imposed reporting requirements and fiduciary-like responsibilities on trustees of labormanagement trust funds.
Tax laws have also favored retirement plans. Money set aside by employers for
retirement funds for themselves and their employees has long been tax deductible to the
business. INT. RE-V. CODE OF 1954, § 404. Also, retirement benefits, being taxed in the
year of receipt instead of in the year the right to them accrues, are subject to lower
income tax rates.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975) reads in part:
(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes.., retirement benefits ....
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
56. This principle was applied to Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
57. The courts may disagree with an agency as it applies its act to a particular case,
especially if, like the EEOC, the agency's proceedings are nonadversary in nature (See
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-.33 (1975)), but the agency is probably right when it finds that an
entire area is covered, or not covered by the Act under which it operates. Agencies
may misconstrue facts or misapply the law, but they are responsive to political pressure,
and they are the next best institution to Congress for determining if given interests
should be affected by legislation.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (Supp. II 1972).
59. See Berstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in
Pension Programs, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 1203, 1215 n.38 (1974). The article is a
valuable introduction to actuarial practices employed in the use of retirement funds.
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It is not clear whether the court used section
Act proscribes . . . ."
703 (a) (2) to define the scope of the Act or to define conduct within
the scope of the Act which is prohibited. If the court was defining the
scope of the Act, it unfortunately failed to explain the reasoning which
led it to conclude that retirement plans are "employment opportunities"
or affect the "status as an employee." If it was defining conduct within
the scope of the Act which is prohibited, it has done no more than
repeat the language of the law and assert that it was violated. However,
reflection may reveal the court's reasoning. The plaintiff in the case
had been forced to retire at age 62, three years earlier than would have
been the case for a male. The right to keep on working is surely an
employment opportunity and being compelled to retire affects one's
status as an employee. On the facts of the case, then, retirement
benefits themselves were not the opportunity protected; but because the
retirement plan affected the plaintiff's right to continue working, the
only way to protect this right was to include the plan within the scope of
the Act.
Not many other cases will fit within the framework of Bartmess, and
thus the case stands as narrow authority for application of section
703 (a) (2) to retirement funds. Yet the language of the section is
broad enough to reach retirement funds. If the plain meaning of the
language of the statute is any guide, it would seem that retirement
benefits are employment opportunities and that contributions withheld
from wages affect one's status as an employee, as those words are
ordinarily used. The same considerations of policy which lead to the
conclusion that section 703(a)(1) applies to retirement funds apply
with equal force to section 703 (a) (2).61
60. 444 F.2d at 1189.
61. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text. Are the two sections coextensive?
The fact that Congress used language in section 703(a)(2) that is different from the
language employed in section 703 (a) (1), when it could have as easily used identical
language in both sections, leads one to conclude that the two sections were intended to
have different meanings. With no sacrifice of grammar or style, section 703(a)(2)
could have read:
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any such individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
This writer, however, is aware of no case which distinguishes between them, nor is he
able rationally to distinguish between them in his own mind. Rather, it seems that
Congress intended to write the broadest possible language to define the reach of Title
VII, and instead of choosing between two formulations, it used both. Of course, even if
the two sections do apply to different conduct, it is possible that they overlap in the case

1976]

RETIREMENT FUNDS

607

The fourth and final reason given by the Bartmess court for applying
the Act to retirement funds was language found in Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 2 which had been decided only three weeks earlier. There
the court found an unlawful employment practice in an airline's policy
of requiring female cabin attendants to remain unmarried, while allowing male cabin attendants to marry. The Bartmess court 3 seized on the
following language of Sprogis:
[In forbidding employers to discriminate against 'individuals because
of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.8 4

This assertion was used in Bartmess to establish the scope of the Act,
and to counter the argument that the Act does not apply to retirement
funds. Unfortunately, the language quoted from Sprogis was an explication of that case's holding that the employer's policy was discriminatory. No argument was made that the no-marriage policy applied to
women was outside the scope of the Act, and thus there was no need to
define the scope of the Act. Nor did any question of retirement benefits
arise in Sprogis. Accordingly, although the language quoted may be
compelling in its force, it is no help in determining whether or not
retirement funds are covered by Title VII. 5
of retirement funds. At this point, perhaps all that can be said is that Bartmess is
authority on its facts that retirement funds are covered by section 703 (a) (2).
62. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
63. Judge Cummings sat on both panels of the Seventh Circuit; he wrote the opinion

in Sprogis.
64. 444 F.2d at 1189, quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (emphasis added).
65. Thus far, no distinction has been drawn between retirement plans of private and
public employees. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power, 387 F.
Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), and Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore.
1975), -are the first cases to apply Title VII to the retirement funds of public employers;
all of the other cases mentioned involved private funds. 'Is any distinction between
private and public funds appropriate? In determining whether such a distinction exists,
it is important to note that before the 1972 amendments to the Act, public employers
were exempted from Title VII altogether, and thus, it is not surprising that the authorities to date have reviewed situations involving only private funds. But section 701(b),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1972), now includes public employers, and the legislative history
of the 1972 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended to protect public employees as fully as private employees. Referring to Senator Ervin's attempt to strike a proposed amendment to the Act extending its coverage to public employees, Senator Javits
stated:
As recently as 1969, this was the subject of special consideration by the United
States Commission on Civil Rights which held flatly-and I'll read from page 10
of the committee's report: "State and local governments have failed to assure equal

job opportunity...."
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Of the four reasons advanced by the Bartmess court for applying the

Act to retirement funds, the most persuasive appear to be the similar
treatment of retirement funds under the National Labor Relations Act
and the position of the EEOC that such funds are within the scope of

the Act. Buttressing the court's conclusion are the strong policy
considerations militating in favor of protecting the employee's interest in
retirement programs. Thus, while the court's reference to section 703
It is for this reason, . . . that one of the greatest reforms in this bill is its applicability to those who are engaged in State and local employment-I repeat, ten million employees, the largest single block in any one calling of all the employees, as
there are now about 80 million in the entire American work force. If anybody,
as a matter of morality, is entitled to equal employment opportunity, it certainly
is these people; and the only way they can get it, because the authority so far as
they are concerned is the State, is at the hands of the United States ....
LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 1173-74. In addition, the EEOC has ruled that
retirement funds of public employers are covered by Title VII. In two decisions, 2 CCH
Labor Law Rep. (Employment Practices Guide) % 6431 (1974) and 2 CCH Labor Law
Rep. (Employment Practices Guide) 6447 (1975), the Commission decided that public
employers' practices like those in Manhart and Henderson were unlawful. These decisions are discussed more fully at notes 100-107 infra and accompanying text. Although
the decisions do not deal expressly with the question of whether the Act applies to public
employers' retirement funds, such a finding is implicit in the opinions.
With reference to Manhart, which arose in California, the Supreme Court of
California has held that pensions paid by a public employer are vested rights, not
revocable gratuities, "and . . . in a sense a part of the contract of employment itself."
O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 661-62 (1917). If pension rights are tantamount to a
clause in the contract of employment, they must be compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, or employment opportunities as those words are used in the
Act. See note 9 supra.
The power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate retirement funds of
public employers is questionable (see National League of Cities v. Usery, 44 U.S.L.W.
4974 (June 24, 1976)), and it may be necessary to look for other sources of constitutional
authority. That Congress relied upon section five of the fourteenth amendment in extending Title VII to governmental employers was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 44 U.S.L.W. 5120 (June 28, 1976). But the Court expressly left open
the question of whether "the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are...
a proper exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 5123 n.11. If the impact of Title VII on public retirement funds is limited to
violations of the fourteenth amendment as found by the courts, plaintiffs complaining
of sex discrimination face a serious obstacle: the Supreme Court has already held in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), that the fourteenth amendment is not offended
by a state disability insurance program which omits benefits for women in normal pregnancy. Even though only women become pregnant, the Court found no infringement
on equal protection because there was a clear connection between the costs of the disability insurance program and its coverage. Likewise, it may be argued that there is
a rational connection between female longevity and sex-based mortality tables; and it
is conceivable that the courts will hold it rational to allocate the cost of female longevity
to the class of women alone, rather than to the class of all employees-just as they have
held rational the allocation of the cost of normal pregnancy to the class of normally
pregnant women alone.
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(a)(2) may be of limited application and its reliance on Sprogis misplaced, Bartmess nonetheless presents a sound rationale upon which
to conclude that Title VII should apply to retirement funds. The next

step in the analysis is to determine whether or not the Act prohibits
a fund from exacting a higher contribution from, or paying a lower ben-

efit to, a female as compared to her male counterpart.
III.

EQUAL 'CONTRIBUTIONS AND EQUAL BENEFITS

A.

Applying Class Characteristicsto a
Member of the Class

In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and
Power 0 a retirement fund for public employees 67 was financed by a
combination of both employer and employee contributions. The periodic benefits paid to counterparts upon retirement were equal, but female

employee contributions were approximately 15 'percent greater than
those of their male counterparts. The court, in finding this practice
constitutes an unlawful employment practice under the Act, 8 stated
[t]he basic principle. . that sexual discrimination under § 703 (a) (1)
exists whenever general fact characteristics of sex-defined class are
automatically applied to an individual within that class. 69
In so holding, the court relied principally on four cases: Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp.,7 0 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific, Co.,71 Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,7 2 and Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Pub66. 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
67. See note 65 supra.
68. 387 F. Supp. at 983.
69. Id. Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore. 1975), contemplated the
other side of the problem. In Henderson there were actually two separate funds. One
was financed entirely by employer contributions and, because the employer contributed
more for females than it did for males, the periodic benefits were equal for counterparts;
this fund was not attacked. The other fund was financed entirely by employee contributions, which were equal for counterparts, with the result that females received a monthly
benefit of approximately 90 percent of the benefit paid to their male counterparts. The
latter fund, of course, was challenged. Id. at 1273. The Henderson opinion relied
heavily on Manhart, so that examination of the latter case will reveal the basis upon
which the courts have prohibited retirement funds from charging a female higher contributions or paying her lower periodic benefits, than her male counterpart.
70. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
71. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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lishing Co.7" An examination of these cases may cast some light, and
some shadows, on the court's reasoning.

In Phillips, the employer refused to accept employment applications from women with pre-school age children, although it accepted
applications from similarly situated men. Approximately three-fourths
of the applicants were female, and about three-fourths of the new
hirees were female, thus there was no evidence of discrimination

against women in general. Nevertheless, in a brief per curiam opinion,
the Supreme Court held that section 703(a)74 prohibits an employer
from maintaining one hiring policy for men and another for women."
It is not difficult to understand why the Manhart court found Phillips

to stand for the proposition that characteristics of a class may not be
applied to an individual member of the class. The class consisted of
women with young children; the characteristic was the conflicting

responsibilities of caring for children and of employment, often
resulting in higher absenteeism.

When the characteristic of the

class was applied to an individual member of it, each woman with
young children was denied employment. But rather than using this
73. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. Note that the Court did not cite subsections (1) or (2) of section 703. See note
61 supra and accompanying text.
75. Although the court did not allude to the legislative history of the sex clause in
Title VII, it may be noted that Congress rejected an amendment which would have
confined the reach of the sex ban to discrimination based solely on sex. 110 CoNG. RC.
2728 (1964). Had such an amendment been adopted, the Phillips court might well have
gone the other way, for the employer did not discriminate against all women (which
presumably would have been discrimination based solely on sex) but only against women
with young children.
Phillips is the archetype of what has been characterized as "sex plus" discrimination.
See note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1171-72 (1971). Sex plus discrimination "usually involves the classification of employees on the basis of sex plus one other
ostensibly neutral characteristic." Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1089 (5th Cir. 1975). This type of discrimination has the effect of discriminating, not
against the entire class, but only against a portion of it, by means of a rule which does
not affect the class of the opposite sex. Thus, in Phillips, the discriminatory classification was sex (female) plus a neutral characteristic (having young children). Neither
element was sufficient, since men and women without young children were hired. The
entire class of women was not prejudiced, but only the part of it having young children;
no part of the class of men was prejudiced. See note 94 infra.
However, the retirement fund problem under discussion in this article is not an example of sex plus discrimination because all women are presumed by the retirement
funds to possess the characteristic of female longevity. The funds do not add any characteristic to sex; they simply assume that one aspect of being a woman is living longer
than a man. Also, the practices used do not single out any part of the class of females;
rather the entire class is prejudiced.
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analysis, the Supreme Court justified its holding on the ground that the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of liability by showing that the
employer had one employment policy for men and another for women.
Significantly, the Court did not enter judgment on this showing, but
remanded the case in order to allow the employer an opportunity to establish a defense under the bona fide occupational qualification clause
of section 703(e) .7 Although Justice Marshall believed that such a
defense could not be established, 77 the majority of the Court disagreed:
The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably
more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could
arguably be a basis for distinction under § 703(e) of the Act."8
Thus, the Supreme Court was prepared to allow an employer to apply a
characteristic of a class to an individual member of the class, provided
the employer could prove the characteristic actually existed and was
demonstrably related to job performance. The Manhart principle is
clearly contrary to the apparent views of the Court in Phillips."9
If Phillips is not authority for the principle enunciated in Manhart, it
may be distinguished because the discrimination in Phillips applied only
to some females, namely those with young children, while the discrimination in Manhart applied to all females. If this distinction is of any significance, then Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. might remain authority for the principle of Manhart,for the discrimination in Rosenfeld also
applied to all women. In Rosenfeld the employer refused to hire any
women for the position of telegrapher because the job called for lifting
heavy weights, which the employer believed women could not do. It
made no attempt to determine whether a particular woman could lift the
necessary weight, and on these facts the Ninth Circuit held for the
plaintiff. Like Phillips, Rosenfeld might be read to support the principle that facts characteristic of a class cannot be, applied to an individual
member of the class. Application of the characteristic (a woman's
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
I cannot agree with the Court's indication that a "bona fide occupational
77 ....
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of" Matin Marietta's
business could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with pre-school-age children have family responsibilities that interfere with job
performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities.

400 U.S. at 544.
78. Id.
79. The principle of which Manhart relied affects the question of prima facie liability,
while the Supreme Court in Phillips was commenting on the possible existence of an
affirmative defense. Nevertheless, the Court did approve application of a class characteristic to a member of the class, undoubtedly realizing that not every woman with young
children would be absent from work too often.

612
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inability to lift heavy weights) to the individuals in the class resulted
in the exclusion of all women from the position of telegrapher.

There is, however, a crucial distinction between Manhart and Rosenfeld which vitiates any support Manhart sought in Rosenfeld: a simple
test can be administered to determine whether a woman can lift the
necessary weight.8 0 The entire thrust of Rosenfeld is to require individ-

ual testing to determine if a given individual possesses the undesirable
characteristic."' No individual test, however, is possible when dealing
with retirement funds because the life expectancy of a given individual
cannot be predicted with the same degree of certainty that results from a

test directed to determining physical attributes. It further appears
that the Rosenfeld court questioned the validity of the characteristic
itself, in that some women can in fact lift heavy weights. But in the
retirement fund cases, the accuracy of the mortality tables upon which
the funds is administered has not been so challenged. Thus, while Ro-

senfeld may have used language similar to that used by the court in
Manhart,s2 Rosenfeld contemplated a different set of facts.

Manhart cited two other cases in support of its principle that characteristics of a class may not be applied to individual members of the
class. One is Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,,3 in which the Seventh

Circuit found an unlawful employment practice in an airline's rule prohibiting female cabin attendants from marrying but allowing male cabin
attendants to marry. This case is scant authority for the Manhart principle because the Sprogis court held that -the employer had failed to prove

that unmarried women make better cabin attendants than married
80. Indeed, such a test was undoubtedly administered to a male applicant who looked
too frail for the job.
81. The premise of Title VII. . . is that women are now to be on equal footing
with men. The footing is not equal if a male employee may be appointed to a particular position on a showing that he is physically qualified, but a female employee
is denied an opportunity to demonstrate personal physical qualification. Equality
of footing is established only if employees otherwise entitled to the position,
whether male or female, are excluded only upon a showing of individual incapacity.
This alone accords with the Congressional purpose to eliminate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped conceptions regarding the physical ability of women
to do particular work.
444 F.2d at 1225 (citations omitted).
82. The personnel policy of Southern Pacific here in question is based on "characteristics generally attributed to the group" of exactly the same type that the Commission has announced should not be the basis of an employment decision. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1) (ii). Based on the legislative intent and on the Commission's interpretation, sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might,
to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for the
application of the BFOQ exception . ...
Southern Pacific has not, and could
not allege such a basis here ....
Id. at 1224-25.
83. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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women; therefore, since the employer failed to establish the existence
of the characteristic of the class, there was no need for the court to
determine if it could lawfully be applied to a particular member of the

class.""
Finally, in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. 8 ' the
employer refused to hire a male because of the length of his hair, while
it placed no restrictions on the length of hair of his female counterparts.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit ruled this practice unlawful under Title VII,

but following a rehearing the court sitting en banc reached the opposite
conclusion. 0

The panel opinion in Willingham, therefore, lends no

87
support whatever to the principle of Manhart.

The result of this examination is that, although the principle of
Manhart is attractive, and it may go some distance towards explaining

the error in the thinking of the offending employers,88 it lacks authorita84. The dissenting opinion of Judge Stevens is now particularly pertinent:
As I understand the majority's test, it does not focus on the impact of a rule on
the employment opportunities of the members of one sex as opposed to the other;
instead, the critical inquiry is whether the rule is an irrational impediment derived
from a stereotyped attitude toward females. As a matter of policy, the majority's
view may not only be contemporary but also wise.
444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also noted that "[it may also be
unwise." Id. at 1205 n.21. In either event, he was "unable. . .to find any guidelines
in the language of § 703(a) (1) for differentiating between irrational stereotypes and
reasonable requirements." Id. at 1205-06. If these retirement fund cases ultimately
reach the Supreme Court, at least one Justice will not likely accept the Manhart
principle.
85. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
86. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). The District of Columbia, Eighth and Ninth Circuits are in agreement with the Fifth Circuit holding. See Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
87. The en banc decision in Willingham was announced after the Manhart opinion
was filed.
88. The employer in Phillips thought most women with young children would be
absent from work too often because of their maternal responsibilities; the employer in
Rosenfeld thought most women could not lift heavy weights; the employer in Sprogis
thought unmarried women make better cabin attendants.
However, Manhart's principle does not fully explain the employers' error. One further
element is necessary: the employers did not consider it worth their -while to determine
which women would be absent too often and which would not, which women could lift
heavy weights and which could not; or which married women would make good cabin
attendants and which would not. The courts have insisted that employers make such
individualized determinations, thus painting Title VII with a due process gloss. Of
course, this approach is not applicable to retirement fund cases because individualized
treatment is impossible for it cannot be determined when a given person will die.
For a suggestion that an equal protection gloss has also been added by the courts to
Title VII, see Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tive support. However, even if it is accepted as a new principle of law,
there remains the question of whether the court satisfactorily decided
the case.
Manhart's principle is that facts characteristic of a class may not be
applied to individual members of the class. The court implicitly reasoned that the class was female employees and the characteristic was
average female longevity. The application of the characteristic to an
individual woman in calculating her employee contribution resulted in a
determination that she will live 19 years following her retirement at
age 65. The same process determined that a man will live only 14 years
following his retirement, with the result that the male's contributions were
lower than his female counterpart's. The court argued that because no
individual's life expectancy can be known in advance and because Title
VII requires that each person be treated as an individual, it is discrimination to require a female to contribute more than her counterpart. The
error of this argument is that the characteristic of female longevity was
not applied to any individual woman. The retirement fund did not
know that Miss Jones or Mrs. Smith would live for 19 years after she
retired. Rather, the fund applied a characteristic of the class to the
class as a whole. It determined how much money in the form of contributions it needed in order to fund benefits at a certain level for the
class of females, and it asked each female to pay her proportionate
share, similar to an insurance program. Since it did the same for males,
there were in effect two separate retirement funds. Each employee,
male or female had the opportunity to participate in a self-sustaining
retirement fund. The women's fund spent more money, so the
women had to contribute more to it. Expressed another way, the
extent to which female longevity exceeded male longevity was borne by
the class of women alone, rather than being spread over the class of all
employees.
If there is any unlawful discrimination in this scheme, it must be
found either in the definition of the employment opportunity or in the
manner in which the cost of female longevity is allocated. The relevant
questions are therefore different. Is the Act satisfied if a retirement
fund offers each sex the opportunity to participate in a separate selfsustaining retirement fund, or does the Act demand that counterparts pay the same amount in contributions and receive the same
amount in periodic benefits? Is the Act satisfied if the cost of female
longevity is spread over the class of women alone, or does the Act
require that the cost be allocated to the class of all employees? The
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Manhart opinion does not address these issues, and it is appropriate to
consider them now.
B.

Defining Equality of Opportunity in
Retirement Plans

In determining the impact of the Act on retirement funds, the first
step is to expound a theory of sex discrimination which is generally
applicable to the sex cases, and the second step is to apply it to the
problem at hand. The principle offered in Manhart was unsatisfactory
since it was neither derived from the authorities nor confronted the issues before the court. However, in Phillips,the Supreme Court supplied
a straightforward concept based on the language of the Act: "Section
703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like
qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their
sex.""" In Phillips women with young children, equally as qualified as
men with young children, were not hired although men were. Thus
men with children were afforded an employment opportunity that
women of like status were denied.
The theory of Phillips can be used to explain the leading cases on
sex discrimination where it has been determined that differences in
employment practices, resting on the basis of sex, constitute an unlawful employment practice.90
89. 400 U.S. at 544. The Court's language is drawn more from section 703 (a)(2)
than from section 703(a) (1).
90. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971), the
employer refused to hire any women as telegraphers because the job called for lifting
heavy weights. This difference in employment practices, resting solely on the basis of
sex, was held to constitute an unlawful employment practice. Id. at 1227. See also
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971), male cabin attendants were allowed to marry, but female cabin attendants,
equally qualified as their male counterparts, were prohibited from marrying. Id. at
1196-97. Similarly, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), the employer refused to hire any males as cabin
attendants. The court found this practice unlawful because men and women were
equally qualified to hold the job, but men were denied the opportunity because of their
sex. In Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 939 (1971), women were required to retire at age 62, but men were allowed to work
until age 65. The employment opportunity was the chance to work three additional
years, which was given to men but denied to women, and the defendant was liable to pay
the plaintiff the salary of which she was unlawfully deprived. And in the other principal
retirement case, Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973), men
could retire only at age 65 with 25 years of service unless they accepted reduced periodic
benefits, while women could retire with full benefits at age 60 with 20 years of service.
The employment opportunity was retirement at age 60 with full benefits, and the court
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If persons of like qualifications must be given the same employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex, the question remains how to apply
this theory to the retirement fund problem. In most sex discrimination
cases, men or women were denied access to an opportunity altogether.
In the retirement fund cases, men and women have access to the opportunity; it is not as though the women were denied pensions. But the
ordered that it be made available to men as well as women. Finally, in Taylor v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 6 FEP 50 (N.D. Ala. 1972), a collectively bargained
sickness and accident program paid women $10.00 per month less than it paid men,
which the court found to be a violation of Title VII. The defendants in Taylor argued
that the cost of providing benefits for females exceeded the cost of benefits for males, but
the court found this fact immaterial. It is the case most analogous to Manhart and
Henderson.
However, the circuit courts of appeals have engrafted a qualification on the Phillips
rule, i.e., an employer may impose different employment rules upon the sexes if the distinction does not affect a significant or fundamental right. This qualification was developed in cases in which men have challenged rules enunciated by their employers, allowing women to wear their hair at any length but requiring men to keep their hair short.
Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc.,
488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagen v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1973). The reasoning of these cases rests on a balancing between the employee's interests and the employer's policy which is challenged. Thus, since a person
cannot change his race, sex, or national origin, he should never be discriminated against
based on these characteristics. Although it cannot be denied that an employer has an
interest in these types of employee characteristics, since his customers and other employees may react to them, the public policy of eliminating discrimination in employment outweighs the employer's interest.
Employees also have significant interests in characteristics which are not immutable.
As for marital status and children, these conditions may be subject to voluntary control,
but the individual's interest in regulating such personal matters outweighs the employer's
interest in them. In addition, their impact on the employer's business is generally marginal, and, in those instances where they do have a noticeable effect, the specific cases
can be handled individually at a cost which does not exceed the value of protecting the
rights in question. Thus, a woman who is absent too often because her children are
ill or whose husband pesters her supervisor may be counseled, reassigned, or terminated.
Such an individualized approach is suggested in Sprogis:
mhe narrow exception in section 703(e) calls for employers to treat their employees as individuals. United's blanket prophylactic rule prohibiting marriage unjustifiably punishes a large class of prospective, otherwise qualified and competent
employees where an individualized response could adequately dispose of any real
employment conflicts.
444 F.2d at 1199.
But hair length is not so significant a characteristic as race, sex, or family status, and
the courts have concluded that the interest of the employer in the impression that his
employees make on his customers or clients is stronger than the interest of an employee
in his hair style. One may wonder how the judges would have reacted to a rule which
allowed whites to wear their hair in any fashion but prohibited blacks from wearing
naturals.
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women must make higher contributions or receive lower periodic benefits because they live longer. 91 Therefore, the issue is whether men
and women are truly offered the same opportunity. The answer depends on how the opportunity is defined. 92
The employment opportunity offered by retirement funds is defined
by the funds as the total benefits received by the respective sexes as a
class. Present retirement funds utilize this approach on the rationale
that the funds offer equal benefits at equal cost to men and women
because each sex takes out of its fund a sum of money proportionate
to the amount of money it puts in or, expressed another way, the ratio
of contributions to benefits is the same for each fund.
The challenge to this system is predicated on the belief that the
employment opportunity should be defined in terms of the costs and
benefits for each individual person, regardless of sex. It is irrelevant
what the class may receive; the "average" person is a statistical abstraction, and what he pays and receives is important only to actuaries trying
to explain their art to laymen. What is significant is what each individual person gives and receives.
When the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court9 3 is applied to
the retirement fund problem it is clear that the issue is whether equal employment opportunities are offered if separate funds are maintained for
males and females, with the result that benefits received by the class of
each sex are commensurate with the class's contributions-the present
practice; or whether the Act requires that opportunities be measured in
terms of the contributions made and benefits received by each individual female vis-h-vis her male counterpart-equal contributions from
and periodic benefits to counterparts. Several reasons are offered to
show that individual, not class, contributions and periodic benefits must
be equal.
First, a retirement fund, like an insurance scheme, is designed to
protect individual persons, not classes of persons. Not knowing when
he will die, and fearing the risk of poverty in his declining years, an
employee takes a legal gamble. If he outlives the average person, he
wins because he receives more from the retirement fund than he contrib91. It is unlikely that retirement funds would argue that men and women do not
possess like qualifications. A typical fund measures benefits based on years of service
with the employer and the average compensation during a particular period of time.
Male and female counterparts are identical in these regards.
92. The argument that Title VII applies to retirement funds also shows that retirement
benefits are a significant opportunity. See notes 14-60 supra and accompanying text.
93. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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uted. If he dies before the average person, he loses in an economic
sense because he receives less than he contributed. As an individual, he
chooses to forego current gratification in order to receive, for himself,
future protection. Of course, these facts are as true of women as they
are of men. Each person, irrespective of sex, joins the retirement fund
in order to pay for his or her own retirement, and not to pay for the
retirement of all those who comprise his or her sexual class. Therefore,
it is reasonable to define the opportunity offered by a retirement fund
only in terms of individual contributions and individual benefits. Class
analysis simply ignores the purpose of retirement funds.
Second, the retirement fund which benefits both sexes exists
because of the success of the business in which the employees labor. The
female employee contributes exactly as much to the success of the
enterprise as her male counterpart. She has worked alongside of her
male counterpart at the same job and for as many years as he has. Her
achievements, her loyalty, her sacrifices have been the equal of his. Her
rewards, too, should be the equal of his, and at the same cost to her.
Only since 1965 has she been guaranteed the right to equal employment
opportunities."4 Is this guarantee so illusive, so fragile that a woman
may now aspire to jobs which in the past were closed to her, but only if
she will accept a lesser degree of remuneration?
Third, the needs of the female are equal to those of her male
counterpart. Although generalizations may be hurled against each
other,95 no hard evidence exists to prove that men need money any more
than women. Indeed, the purpose of the Equal Pay Act of 19630 is to
guarantee that old notions about men's greater need for money cease to
prejudice women in employment. Having equal needs, a woman should
receive equal funds with which to meet those needs.
Fourth, contributions to a retirement fund are analogous to a tax.
Taxes are levied to raise money, but a rational legislator takes into
account the effect of the tax on the people who pay it; indeed, sometimes the effect is more important than the revenue. The alcoholic
beverages tax not only raises money; it also discourages the use of
alcohol. The income tax may raise substantial revenues, but it also
redistributes wealth and encourages certain forms of spending. Like94. See notes 9-11 supra.
95. During his working years, a man must support his family; yet many women are
rearing children with little or no help from the father. During his retirement, a man's
pension must support both himself and his wife; yet women outlive their husbands and
must survive on their own, and costs like rent are no greater for two than for one.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
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wise, the retirement tax on employees raises money to fund the retirement system, but it should not be ignored that, unless it falls equally on
male and female counterparts, it favors men over women in their daily
lives: it gives men a higher standard of living during their working years
or their retirement. What conduct is affected by the extra retirement
tax on women? Is there any evidence that men spend their income for
better social purposes than women, which might justify men receiving a
greater income?
It may be argued that the extra tax on women is necessary in order to
fund the cost of female longevity, but this argument assumes that a cost
must be funded in the same manner as it is measured, which is not the
case. It is possible to determine the cost of male and female longevity
separately, by use of sex-segregated mortality tables, and yet to spread
that cost evenly over the class of all employees. The manner in which
this may be accomplished is discussed below, and as indicated there, if
an extra retirement tax is necessary to pay for female longevity, it may
be assessed equally to males and females alike, without endangering the
funding of the retirement plan.9 7
Fifth, if a man and a woman of the same age retire on the same date,
each having earned the right to the same level of retirement benefits-assume fraternal twins who are perfect counterparts in their employment-and if they die on the same date, the man will have paid less
money in contributions or will have received more money in benefits
than the woman. For the accident of his birth, the man receives a
higher payroll or retirement check each month, and his female counterpart will never catch up. If this happenstance were an occasional
aberration, it might be overlooked, but it occurs in five cases out of
every six; for 84 percent of female retirees die in the same year as
male retirees."" Class analysis obscures this astonishing fact, but it
must not be ignored. Unless individual contributions and periodic
benefits are equal, five women out of six pay more in contributions
or receive less in benefits than their male counterparts.
Sixth, the language of the Act supports the view that the employment opportunity should be based on equal contributions from
and payments to individuals. For example, consider the case of
an applicant for promotion who sues his employer on the ground
that he was denied promotion because of his race or religion or national
origin. Suppose the employer offers the following defense: he has equal
97. See text following note 121 infra.
98. Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. at 1275, n.5.
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numbers of employees who belong to the plaintiff's class and to the
majority class; the total remuneration paid to the two classes is equal;
and the number of persons holding the job which the plaintiff seeks is
the same in the two classes. Has the employer stated a defense under
Title VII? Clearly, he has not, for the Act is not satisfied by numbers.
Classes are not guaranteed equal employment opportunities; individuals
are. Had Congress intended to create a fourth estate and protect it,
section 703(a)(1) might have read, "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge members of a protected class in greater numbers than members of other classes." But the Act does not so read. Instead, section
703(a) (1) reads, "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . ..

."

The same focus on the individual appears in section 703 (a) (2) as well:
"to limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities. . .

."

To an individual, it matters not that his class is treated

the same as another class; it matters only that he was not the victim of
discrimination because of membership in his class. If our applicant can
prove that he was the most qualified person for the promotion, but was
denied it because of his membership in a protected class, he will prevail
against his employer's statistics. 99 Likewise, it matters not to a female
employee that her class is in the same position as the class of male
employees; it matters only that, because of her membership in the class
of females, she pays higher contributions or receives lower benefits than
her male counterpart.
Finally, support for the view that individual, not class, characteristics
control can be found in two decisions rendered by the EEOC. In
one, 100 female employees of a public employer were charged higher contributions to the retirement fund than their male counterparts, although
counterparts were paid equal periodic benefits. The EEOC found this
violated the Act, which requires equality of opportunity be afforded
individuals and not classes. The Commission stated:
A pension of X dollars per month paid to both males and females
will probably result in a larger "average total payment" to females than
to males (because it is likely that the females will on the average live
longer). It might therefore be argued that, with equal monthly pensions, the "benefits to the sexes" are not the same. Title VII is not,
99. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco, 12 F.E.P. 314, 328 n.18 (4th Cir. 1976).
100. 2 CCH EEOC Decisions (Employment Practices Guide) 1 6447 (1975).
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however, concerned with whether benefits to each sex group as a class
are equal-Title VII looks to individualbenefits.' 01

In the second case,'10 2 the charging party was a public employee
contributing to a fund to which her employer would make an additional

contribution when she retired, and the combined contributions would
be used to purchase an annuity. Because sex-segregated mortality
tables were used to compute her life expectancy, she could expect to
receive substantially less each month from her annuity than her male

counterpart. The Commission found this practice to be a violation of
Title VII for essentially the same reason as that relied upon in Manhart,
namely, the employer had wrongfully appealed to the average character-

istics of a particular class protected by the Act. 10 3 In response to the
employer's argument that equal monthly payments would discriminate
in favor of females, since they live longer and would receive more money
than males, the Commission said that no mortality table can predict
when an individual person will die, but only when large numbers of

persons will die, 04 and that the purpose of a mortality table is only to
predict risks for a large class.

05

In other words, the Commission

reasoned that, because it cannot be determined when a given person will
die, it is unfair to pay a given female a lower monthly benefit on the
chance that she may outlive her male counterpart.
The employer further argued that, if it switched to unisex mortality
tables, which reflect deaths in the population as a whole instead of

deaths for just one sex, it would charge a male more for an annuity than
he could obtain for his money from a private insurance company (which
uses sex-segregated tables) and, therefore, males would end up subsidiz101. Id. 6447, at 4191.
102. Id. 6431.
103. The Commission's decision does not indicate whether it found the characteristic
to be valid or not. If the characteristic is not valid (as in Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), where the court found
the employer had failed to prove that unmarried women make better cabin attendants
than married women), the discussion may cease. However, in the later decision, 2 CCII
EEOC Decisions (Employment Practices Guide)
6447 (1975), the Commission
appears to have accepted the validity of the characteristic of female longevity. Therefore, the issue is the significance or effect of the characteristic.
104. The Commission relied on a valuable commentary, Note Sex Discriminationand
Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 BOsTON U.L. REv. 624 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Sex-Based Mortality Tables].
105. Therefore, mortality tables are useful to determine how much money must be
raised in order to fund benefits for a given class, but they do not dictate that the money
must be raised from the very same class. That is, mortality tables predict risks, but they
do not say how to spread those risks. See text following note 121 infra.
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ing the benefits for females.' 06 This argument has been widely raised
by those employers using similar retirement funds. Keenly sensitive to
the interests of their male beneficiaries, employers using such funds
argue that men should not bear the cost of female longevity. The class
of women outlives the class of men, they contend, and thus it costs more
to fund benefits for the women. Women should bear this cost because
it is unfair to ask men to contribute towards the cost of women's
benefits. In effect, it is maintained that equalization of contributions
and benefits would give women a greater employment opportunity than
men.

1 07

The problem with this argument is that is focuses upon the class, and
not the individual. As discussed earlier, the proper approach under the
Act is the individual approach. 10 8 Therefore this argument is not persuasive. But even if this class analysis must be used, in view of the fact
that the benefits must be equalized, the issue remains which class should
bear the cost: The class of all employees or that of women alone?
C. Spreading the Cost of FemaleLongevity
One of three means may be used to equalize contributions for male
106. It appears that the employer also argued that purchasing annuities that paid equal
periodic benefits to males and females would cost it more money. The Commission
responded by citing its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.9(e) (1975): "It shall not be a defense under Title VIII (sic) to a charge of sex
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex
than the other." It also cited Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 6 FEP 50 (N.D.
Ala. 1972), but neither the Guideline nor the Taylor case offer any reasons for the rule.
However, since its effect is to require the employer to pay the extra cost of females'
benefits and the employer will take this money out of funds it might otherwise apply to
employee remuneration, the effect of the rule is to spread the costs of such benefits over
the class of all employees. Therefore, the discussion concerning the employer's argument on unisex tables is applicable to the Guideline and Taylor, because the effect of
unisex tables is also to spread costs over the class of all employees.
107. Reverting to the illustration in note 6 supra, if male contributions are $14.00, and
female contributions are the same, the retirement fund will have on hand (including
matching employer contributions) $56.00 with which to fund benefits for the counterparts. The male will live 14 years and the female will live 19 years after retirement, so
that the $56.00 in available money must be divided into 33 equal parts if the counterparts are to receive equal periodic benefits. The result is that each retiree will be paid
a pension of approximately $1.70 per year. The male is subsidizing the female's benefit
in that, if separate funds are maintained for each sex, he would have been paid a pension
of $2.00 per year. The female is receiving the greater employment opportunity in that,
while the male pays $14.00 and receives $23.80, the female pays the same $14.00 and
receives $32.30.
108. See text accompanying notes 93-100 supra.
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and female counterparts. 10 9 One is to use unisex mortality tables.
Another is to charge all employees contributions at the rate called for by
male mortality tables and to charge the employer for any predicted
shortfall in funding. The third is to assess the shortfall to all employees
in equal shares. All of these means have the same effect, namely, the
cost of female longevity is allocated over the class of all employees.
This effect is apparent with unisex tables: rather than determining
employee contributions by the average lifespan of a male or female, each
employee contribution is assessed according to when the average individual will die. Female longevity is not singled out, but the cost is
averaged throughout the class of all employees. The effect is the same
if all employees make contributions according to male mortality tables
and the employer pays the difference, for the extra employer dollars
will undoubtedly come from money otherwise available for employee
remuneration. With so much less in the pot to be divided into paychecks, each employee receives a little less in wages and, indirectly,
contributes to the retirement fund. Of course, if the predicted shortfall
is not paid by the employer, but charged equally to all employees, the
cost is plainly spread throughout the whole working population. If
contributions and periodic benefits for counterparts are to be equalized,
therefore, the question is whether the cost of female longevity should be
borne by the class of all employees, or whether that cost should remain
where it is now, on the class of women alone. For several reasons the
right class is the class of all employees.
Assume retirement funds had never used sex-segregated mortality
tables; instead, assume they had available to them only unisex tables.110
Would men have had any basis under Title VII for challenging retirement funds which used unisex tables? Surely not, for what in the Act
109. It is assumed that employers using retirement funds would take steps to ensure
that they remain actuarily sound, that is, current funding would be adjusted to meet
projected liabilities.
110. It has been suggested that retirement funds use sex-segregated mortality tables
because insurance companies have traditionally kept separate statistics on men and
women. They do so, first, because statistics based on sex are easy to collect. Second,
with regard to annuity policies, the much stronger market between the sexes is male, and
sex-segregated tables allow the companies to keep the premiums on annuity policies for
males lower than unisex tables would allow. Third, with regard to life insurance
policies, again the stronger market is male. Sex-segregated tables allow the companies to
measure their exposure more accurately because if unisex tables were used, though most
policy holders were male, the companies would be paying out greater sums than they had
anticipated. The great question is whether these facts of business life should be allowed
to prejudice women in their employment opportunities. See Note, Sex-Based Mortality
Tables, supra note 105.
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allows one to complain of being classified as a person? Unisex tables
do not classify an individual "because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin;" they do not "limit, segregate, or
classify . . . in any way which would deprive . . . any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee . . . ." Unisex tables ignore all such classifications, and for
this reason they are a model of even-handed treatment of employees.
If unisex tables are lawful under Title VII, it follows that spreading
the cost of female longevity evenly over the class of all employees
(which unisex tables do) is also lawful. Other means of spreading this
cost over the class of all employees should be lawful as well, so that it is
equally legal to charge all employees' contributions at the rate called for
by male mortality tables and to charge the employer for any predicted
shortfall in funding or, instead of charging the employer, to charge the
shortfall to all employees in equal shares."'
Assume again that unisex mortality tables were in exclusive use;
assume also that the retirement funds changed, not to sex-segregated
tables, but to race-segregated tables. It is well established that the
nonwhite population has a shorter life expectancy than the white population. 1 2 Would any court uphold a practice of charging different
contributions or paying different periodic benefits based on race or
color? Yet its justification is exactly the same as the one for sexsegregated tables, namely that each class should pay its own way. The
flaw in the justification is that it creates a class which Title VII forbids."
Retirement funds reply that they do not treat women differently because of their sex but because of their longevity. There are two re111. This observation is particularly important in light of the problems associated with
unisex tables. See text following note 121 infra.
112. INFORMATION PLFASE ALMwAC 734 (1975).
113. It has been argued by counsel for retirement funds that Congress intended to give
sex a lesser degree of protection than race, but such legislative history as exists is
contrary. During the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the House of Representatives rejected an amendment limiting protection of sex to discrimination based solely on
sex. See note 74 supra. During the debates on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Senator Javits, after quoting from a report of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, stated about the Act: "Not only is this applicable to minorities; it is also
applicable on the ground of sex. The committee report reflects that very clearly . .. .
LEGIsLATE Hisroay, supranote 42, at 1174.
It is true that the bona fide occupational qualification exception of section 703(e)
applies to sex and not to race according to its language, but one may ask whether the
letter or spirit of the Act would be violated if a movie producer refused to hire anyone
but a black man to portray the life of Martin Luther King.
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sponses which defeat this argument. First, as noted above, Congress re-

jected an amendment to Title VII which would have limited its protection of sex to discrimination based solely on sex. 114 Congress realized

that discrimination may be subtle and that employers must be prevented from discriminating on factors, on their face neutral, which affect one sex but not the other. Female longevity applies exclusively

to women. Thus, to differentiate on the basis of longevity is tantamount
to discriminating on the basis of sex.' 1 5

The second response to the argument that women are treated differently because of longevity, not sex, is that only the class of women-and
Smokers die before non-smokers.

no other class-is so honored.:""

Obese persons die before slender persons. Alcoholics die before teatotalers. These facts are not speculation. Insurance companies refuse to

issue policies to such persons, or adjust the premiums, or exclude related
risks from coverage. Yet retirement funds uniformly ignore use of alcohol, tobacco, and obesity. Instead, they choose the one characteristic
which applies to women alone, longevity. Do they treat women differently only because of their longevity, or have they chosen longevity

because it applies only to women?"

'

An additional reason for spreading the cost of female longevity over

the class of all employees is that while it may be true that the statistically
average woman lives about five years longer than the statistically aver114. See note 75 supra.
115. Also, distinguishing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), there are no
women at all who benefit on the basis of longevity.
116. That public employers use sex-segregated mortality tables, but ignore tables
which show different life expectancies on account of weight, use of alcohol and tobacco,
etc., leads to an equal protection argument based on the theory that sex (to the exclusion
of other known factors) is an arbitrary classification under the fourteenth amendment.
117. Likewise, many costs of employment which could be attributed to one sex or
the other or some other class are not now calculated or, if calculated, are not assessed
against the appropriate sex. A similar type of cost allocation is used, albeit indirectly, in
two areas outside the retirement picture. For example, women tend to change jobs
more frequently than men, with the result that the employer incurs greater recruitment
and training costs for that sex. Are its wages or retirement privileges affected because of
this cost? In addition, men probably tend to suffer a higher rate of industrial accidents
than women, resulting in the employer paying higher premiums for insurance (or paying
larger awards) for this sex. Are its wages or retirement privileges affected? In both
cases, of course, the answer is no. Many costs like these are never computed. When
they are computed---surely industrial accident expenses are known to the precise dollarthey are not assessed against the class which causes them. The result is that uncomputed
and unassessed costs are spread evenly over the class of all employees, since the money
used to meet such costs is taken from funds otherwise available for employee remuneration. What possible justification is there for spreading these costs one way while
spreading the cost of female longevity another?
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age man, the probability is five out of six that retired women will die at
the same age as their118male counterparts. As the Court observed in
Henderson v. Oregon:

The. great majority of men and women-84 per cent-share common
death ages. That is, for every woman who dies at 81 there is a corres-

ponding man who dies at 81. The remaining 16 per cent are women
who live longer than the majority and men who live shorter. 119
Female longevity is a fact characteristic of fewer than one in six of the
class of females, yet "as a result, each women is penalized because a few
20
live longer and each man benefits because a few men die earlier.'
This fact must be kept in mind as it is decided whether women alone, or
all employees together, should bear the cost of female longevity. For if
extra longevity were a characteristic of each and every woman, perhaps
it would be fair to ask women alone to bear this cost; but it is a
characteristic of only one woman out of six. If it is unjust for men
to pay for the longevity of women, it is equally unjust for the 84 percent
of women who die at the same time as their male counterparts to pay for
the extra longevity of the remaining 16 percent. Because it cannot
be determined which women will outlive their counterparts, the only fair
approach is to allocate the cost of their benefits over the class of all
employees. The 84 percent of women deserve protection as much as
the men. There is no sound reason for protecting the class of men
alone.
Also, while there is not any reason for protecting men from the cost
of benefits for the superannuated 16 percent, there is a very good
reason for asking men to share in the cost: it is the ability of the class to
pay. If the cost of female longevity is charged to the class of women
alone, the burden per person is at least twice as heavy as if the cost is
spread over the class of all employees. 2 ' It is surely more equitable
that each employee (who had an equal chance of being born male or
female and who, at retirement, has an almost equal chance of dying in
the same year as his counterpart) be asked to pay five or six percent
118. 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D.Ore. 1975).
119. Id. at 1275 n.5. This surprising fact, which cuts down to size the overemphasized statistic of female longevity, is drawn from a simple graph on which the
numbers of male and female deaths are plotted against ages at death.
120. See generally id.
121. The burden is really doubled since there are more working men than working
women.
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more in contributions than that women alone be asked to pay 15 percent more than men.
Allocation of the cost of female longevity to the class of all employees
creates two practical problems. First, if unisex mortality tables are
used, the retirement fund of a predominately male work force will be
overfunded, while the fund of a predominately female work force will be
underfunded. Indeed, only a work force which mirrors the sex distribution of the population as a whole will be funded accurately. It cannot
be gainsaid that all employees have a strong interest in properly funded
retirement programs, and if appropriate adjustments cannot be made to
unisex tables, they may not prove a practicable alternative. But this is
not to say that the reason for using, that the cost of female longevity
should be spread over the class of all employees, must be abandoned.
For there is a fundamental distinction between measuring a cost and
spreading that cost.
The objection to unisex tables is that they do not measure the cost of
female longevity accurately enough; therefore, it may be necessary to
abandon them for that purpose, but their function in spreading the cost
of female longevity evenly over the class of all employees remains viable.
Conversely, the objection to sex-segregated mortality tables goes solely
to the way they spread the cost of female longevity; they must not be
used for that purpose, but their ability to measure the cost of female
longevity is beyond criticism. If unisex tables prove unadaptable for
use in a given retirement fund, then sex-segregated tables may be
employed to measure the costs the fund will encounter in the future.
Once the costs are determined, the sex-segregated tables should be put
aside, and the costs should be spread evenly over the class of all
employees. Unisex tables may be used for this purpose; male tables
may be used to establish a basic rate, and the employer may pay any
predicted shortfall; or the shortfall may be assessed in equal shares to all
employees.
The second problem is the unhappy reaction of male employees who
will see their contributions increased while their benefits remain
the same.' 22 As a practical matter, the measure of male discomfort is
122. It is unlikely that equalization of contributions and benefits will cause a reduction in benefits since judgments in favor of women for excess contributions or deficient
benefits are limited by the short limitations period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1973).
Retirement funds will not be called upon to pay out any large portion of their assets to
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within the power of the employer to control. If female contributions are
cut and male contributions are raised simultaneously, the men will
grumble. On the other hand, if female contributions are first lowered to
the level of their male counterparts', and later contributions for both
sexes are raised equally, the season of discontent may be amelioratedor at least placed upon men and women alike. As a legal matter, a
similar problem was faced in the context of seniority rights for blacks
and whites in United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 23 in which the court
stated, "[i]f relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the
majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will
be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to
which the Act is directed.' 24
III.

DEFENSES To SEX DISCRIMINATION IN FUNDING
RETIvMNT PLANS

Retirement funds have interposed three defenses, two based on
the Act itself and one on the eleventh amendment. The first
defense is that disparate levels of contributions and benefits for
counterparts are a bona fide occupational qualification under section
703(e). The second defense is grounded on section 703(h), which
excludes from the Act any conduct authorized under the Equal Pay
Act of 1963. The third defense is that public employers are not liable
to pay damages under the eleventh amendment.
A.

Are DisparateContributionsand PeriodicBenefits a
Bona Fide OccupationalQualification?

It has been argued that disparate contributions and periodic benefits
for counterparts constitute a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) under section 703 (e) of Title VII.125 Further, it is contended

their female beneficiaries, and any future increases in benefits can be gradually funded
over several years.
123. 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 197,1).
124. Id. at 663.

125. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees...
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
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that funds cannot be administered without use of sex-segregated mortality tables and that all employees, including women, have an interest in
seeing their retirement benefits accurately funded.
A close reading of section 703(e) reveals the first error in this
argument, for the BFOQ exception only applies to the act of hiring;
it does not reach the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or opportunities of employment. Congress did not inadvertently
omit reference to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or opportunities of employment when it drafted the section. It included these
words in section 703 (h) ,126 another exception to the coverage of the Act.
The reason for this limitation on the BFOQ exception is apparent: an
employer may refuse to hire someone because of valid business reasons.' 2 7 Once a given individual is hired, the employer must treat the
individual as all other employees are treated.
In addition to the plain meaning of the language of section 703(e)
and the clear policy behind it, the EEOC has issued administrative
guidelines regarding the BFOQ exception,' 28 and those guidelines refer
only to the act of hiring. The Commission has interpreted the exception
narrowly, and significantly, all of the examples it gives as being outside
the BFOQ exception relate to the act of hiring itself.' 29 Thus, as the
EEOC views the Act, disparate contributions and benefits for counterparts cannot aspire to the status of a bona fide occupational qualification.
Courts have read the BFOQ exception as narrowly as has the EEOC.
For example, in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.'8 9 the employer
refused to hire a woman because the job required lifting heavy weights.
The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between lawful and unlawful use of
sex-related characteristics, stating that the BFOQ exception includes

126. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
127. See note 128 infra.
128. Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly....
(ii) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an
actor or actress.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1975).
129. Id. § 1604.2(a) (1) and (b)(1)-(5).
130. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
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"sexual characteristics of the employee [which] are crucial to the successful performance of the job, as they would be for the position of a
wet-nurse," but it is illegal under the Act, and outside the scope of the
BFOQ exception, to rely on "characteristics that might, to one degree or
another, correlate with a particular sex."'13 '
Additionally, with respect to the language of section 703(e) which
allows discrimination based on BFOQ, it should be noted that
disparate contributions and periodic benefits are neither related to
the normal operation of the employers' business nor necessary to subh
operation. This standard was announced in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways 32 in which the employer attempted to justify its refusal
to hire males for cabin attendants on the basis of the BFOQ exception:
We begin with the proposition that use of the word "necessary" in
section 703(e) requires that we apply a business necessity test, not a
business convenience test. That is to say, discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring the members of one sex exclusively.' 33
The level of employee contributions to a retirement fund and the level
of periodic benefits it pays seem unrelated to the diverse businesses
which employers maintain. While it may be argued that contributions
and benefits are important to the retirement funds themselves, it is clear
that a difference in contributions or benefits is not necessary to the
normal operation of the funds. For if the cost of female longevity is
spread over the class of all employees, by means of unisex mortality
tables or male tables with a special assessment applied equally to all
employees, the funds stand in the same actuarial position they presently
34
occupy.'
B.

Are DisparateContributionsandPeriodicBenefits
Authorized by the Equal Pay Act of 1963?
A second potential obstacle to allocation of cost to the entire class of
131. Id. at 1224-25.
132. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
133. Id. at 388.
134. For the retirement funds' counsel who forecast that equal contribution rates and
equal periodic benefits would destroy the actuarial soundness of the funds, Armageddon
may have come sooner than they expected. Gov. Code § 7500 became effective in
California in 1975, and it requires just this kind of equality for the Manhart fund. CAL.
Gov. CoDE ANN. § 7500 (West Supp. 1976). The fund has not yet gone bankrupt and
if new liabilities are foreseen by its actuaries, they can be funded easily by increasing
the contribution rates for males and females equally.
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employees is that section 703(h) 135 contains an exception for practices
authorized under the Equal Pay Act.' 3 6 This legislation was designed

to guarantee that women doing the same work as men receive the same
compensation, but it was not intended to revolutionize the labor market

by eliminating higher rates of pay based on seniority, or quality or
quantity of production, as is indicated by the exceptions which were
written into the statute to preserve these legitimate practices.' 3 '

While

Title VII was being debated, Senator Bennett realized that its broad
effect might be held to vitiate the exceptions built into the Equal Pay
Act only the year before, and he introduced an amendment which
incorporated into Title VII an exception for any practice allowed by the
Equal Pay Act.'3 " Oddly, three of the exceptions listed in the Equal

Pay Act were already incorporated into the first sentence of section
703(h). 139

Thus, the only effect of the Bennett Amendment was to

bring the final exception of the Equal Pay Act-"a differential based on
any other factor than sex"--into Title VII.
Was Congress merely inserting into the Act a provision limiting its

effect in sex cases to discrimination based solely on sex, though such an
amendment had been previously rejected?'

40

Or was Congress giving

the Wage and Hour Administrator, who interprets the Equal Pay Act, 141
the power to make definitive rulings on sex discrimination in place of
the EEOC?

Whatever the intent of Congress, the Wage and Hour

135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
137. Those pay differentials that are authorized are based on
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.
Id. § 206(d)(1).
138. The Bennett Amendment as enacted reads:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
as amended 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) [the Equal Pay Act].
139.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
140. See note 75 supra.
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 204 (1970).
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Administrator has ruled that, under the Equal Pay Act, an employer
legally may make equal contributions for male and female employees to
a retirement fund (resulting in different periodic benefits for counterparts) or may make different contributions for counterparts causing
the fund to pay males and females the same periodic benefits. 142 Thus,
because practices which are legal under the Equal Pay Act are also
legal under Title VII and because the Wage and Hour Administrator
has sanctioned their practices under his legislation, no violation occurs
under Title VII.
This argument is inconsistent and shortsighted. First, there is a
fundamental flaw in the Administrator's regulation. 143 If the money
which an employer contributes to a pension fund would otherwise be
available for employee remuneration,' 44 then a real difference exists
between the employer who makes equal contributions for counterparts
(resulting in lower periodic benefits for women) and the employer who
contributes more for women (resulting in equal periodic benefits).
The difference is that the employer who contributes more for women
takes those extra dollars from money otherwise available to pay all employees, thus effectively spreading the cost of female longevity evenly
over the class of all employees; while the employer who contributes
equally for counterparts places the cost of female longevity solely on
the class of women (who pay for it in the form of lower periodic benefits). The Administrator's regulation approves both modes of cost
spreading, yet the former method requires men to share the cost of
female longevity and the latter requires women to bear it alone.
Second, the Wage and Hour Administrator has focused only on the
case of employer contributions; he has never ruled on the case of an
employer who requires his employees to make different contributions.
Thus, the Administrator has not ruled on facts similar to those presented in the Manhart case. However, he has ruled on facts similar to
those of Henderson. Both cases were based on the same principle,
namely, each sex pays for its own benefits. Thus, if the Administrator is
to be consistent, he must approve disparate employee contributions as
142. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975).
144. This assertion becomes inaccurate to the degree that a retirement fund's future
liabilities are unfunded. An employer who commits himself to a future unfunded liability is not setting off today's pay increases against today's pension contributions; rather,
he is setting off tomorrow's pay increases against tomorrow's pension liabilities. This
practice is increasingly uncommon. See notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text.
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well as disparate employer contributions. Yet the plain result of that

would be to authorize different take-home pay for male and female
counterparts, which it is hard to imagine the Administrator sanctioning.

14 5

Third, the reason that higher contributions are exacted from females
or that they are paid lower periodic benefits is that it is more costly to
sustain women than men during the period of retirement. The Wage
and Hour Administrator has expressly ruled that an employer may not
justify a wage differential on a difference in the average cost of employing persons of different sexes. 1 46 Thus, while the Administrator has
authorized the practices used by employers in operating retirement
funds, he has outlawed the motivation behind those practices, with the
result that his true position is unclear.
Finally, it must be recognized that the EEOC and not the Wage and
Hour Administrator, is responsible for interpreting Title VII, and the
4
EEOC's position is both clear and consistent.
145. The Administrator appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the Manhart plaintiffs
before the Ninth Circuit, arguing that disparate employee contributions would not be lawful under the Equal Pay Act. This inconsistency further weakens the use of the Administrator's regulations in the retirement problem. Perhaps the most nearly cogent justification for the Administrator's positions is that the Equal Pay Act guarantees only equal
pay for equal work. If counterparts receive the same take-home pay (as in Henderson),
they have no grounds to complain under the Equal Pay Act; but if counterparts receive
different take-home pay (as in Manhart), there is an obvious violation.
146. A wage differential based on claimed differences between the average cost
of employing the employer's women workers as a group and the average cost of
employing the men workers as a group does not qualify as a differential based on
any "factor other than sex," and would result in a violation of the equal pay provisions, if the equal pay standard otherwise applies. To group employees solely on
the basis of sex for purposes of comparison of costs necessarily rests on the assumption that the sex factor alone may justify the wage differential-an assumption
plainly contrary to the terms and purpose of the Equal Pay Act. Wage differentials
so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at
which the Act is directed, because in any grouping by sex of the employees to which
the cost data relates, the group cost experience is necessarily assessed against an
individual of one sex without regard to whether it costs an employer more or less
to employ such individual than a particular individual of the opposite sex under similar working conditions in jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1975) (emphasis added). The final sentence of the quotation
supports this writer's emphasis on individual, rather than class, measurement of retirement costs and benefits. The Wage and Hour Administrator has recognized that it is
not fair to protect males from the cost of female longevity without also protecting the
84 percent of females of whom longevity is not characteristic.
147. See 2 CCH EEOC Decisions (Employment Practices Guide) 1 6447 (1975); id.
6431.
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C. Does the Eleventh Amendment Bar Recovery From the
Retirement Fund of a Public Employer?

The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution 148 precludes an action for money damages in federal court against an unconsenting state. 4 9 On this basis, public employers argue that the federal
courts lack jurisdiction to enter judgments which require their retirement funds to pay any money to their employees. This argument
was rejected without comment in both Manhart and Henderson.
The eleventh amendment defense has not been effective against a
plaintiff seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, 150 nor has the defense
been effective when the defendant was not a state itself, but a city or
county or similar creation of the state."" Recently, the Supreme Court
held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer

52

that the eleventh amendment defense

is not effective in Title VII actions even where the defendant is the
state itself. The Court found that Congress had the power to authorize

the federal courts to award damages against a state guilty of discrimination under Title VII.1S The Court reasoned that the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which made the Act applicable to governmental
employers, were adopted pursuant to Congress's power under the fourteenth amendment and that
the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which
it embodies [citation] are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress
is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation"
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which them148. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to

any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
149. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
150. The power of the federal courts to grant injunctive relief, even though obedience
to the mandate may cost money from the state treasury, is well established. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
151. In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), the Supreme Court said that
while the county is territorially a part of the State, yet politically it is also a corporation created by and with such powers as are given to it by the State. In this respect it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city, town,
or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State.
Id. at 530. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
152. 44 U.S.L.W. 5120 (June 28, 1976).
153. Id. at 5123.
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selves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress
acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that
is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising
that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.
We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts .... 154
Therefore, it now appears that under the reasoning of the Fitzpatrick
case, the eleventh amendment will not provide an unconsenting state
with a sovereign immunity defense to Title VII actions.
IV.

REMEDmS

If a woman has been unlawfully required to contribute more to a
retirement fund than her male counterpart, or if she has contributed
equally but is unlawfully denied equal periodic benefits, or if a man has
been forced to accept a lower periodic benefit upon retirement than is
paid to his female counterpart, the remedy is obviously to enjoin future
inequalities and to make whole the victims for their past losses. The
injunction raises few problems; however, the restitution has caused
problems for some plaintiffs.
The women in Manhart were each awarded a refund of contributions
in excess of those made by their male counterparts, plus seven percent
interest. Because periodic benefits were equal, the plaintiffs were made
whole.
In Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 5 5 in which the plainiff complained that men who retired at age 60 were receiving reduced
pensions, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the men
must be compensated for their losses. On remand, the district court
determined that the men were entitled to an increase in benefits only in
proportion to the work they performed after the effective date of the
Act.'5 If this judgment is upheld, it means that any man who retires
after the court's injunction, requiring the defendant to offer the same
opportunity to men as to women, will receive a full pension, while those
154.
155.
156.
tang v.

Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
11 PEP 330 (D.N.J. 1975), afrd, 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976).
Flynn & Emrich, 12 FEP 1533 (4th Cir. 1976).

But see Chas-
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who retire after the effective date of the Act but before the court issued
the injunction will receive a pension increased only by the fraction of
his service after the effective date of the Act. This result seems incorrect, not only for the harshness of an arbitrary line, but also for its effect, in that it will restrict the benefits for male retirees for their entire
retirement period. One may wonder whether the stringent make-whole
17
policy enunciated by the Supreme Court in Albemarle v. Moody, 1
does not require that the Rosen retirees receive the same periodic
benefits as their female counterparts, provided only that the men retire
after the effective date of the Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether females should pay equal contributions to their retirement
funds and receive equal periodic benefits from them as compared to
their male counterparts is, ultimately, a function of the definition of the
employment opportunity offered by a retirement plan. If the opportunity is defined by classes of persons, present practices are acceptable; if
by individual persons, present practices are unacceptable. The effect of
a class-wide definition of the opportunity is to spread the cost of the
longevity of the 16 percent of women who outlive their counterparts
over the class of women alone; the effect of an individualized definition
is to spread the cost of the 16 percent over the class of all employees.
Equitable considerations seem to require that a woman, who has worked
as diligently as her male counterpart, not receive a lower standard of
living, merely because she might outlive her male counterpart. Nor
does it seem right to protect all men from the cost of female longevity,
without also protecting the 84 percent of women of whom this characteristic is inaccurate. Title VII demands that each person should be
treated the same as every other person. Contributions to and periodic
benefits from retirement funds should be equal for counterparts. The
cost of human longevity should be spread evenly throughout the class of
human beings. Title VII allows no other classification.

157. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

